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A MUNICIPAL POLICE OFFICER'S
JURISDICTION
TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT

Warrantless arrests in Texas
A cursory reading of the principal statutes
authorizing warrantless arrests in Texas seems to
resolve the question ofterritorial jurisdiction. For
example, Article 14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure says that, "(a) peace officer may arrest
an offender without a warrant for any offense
committed in his presence or within his view."
Similar expressions are found in other statutes
authorizing warrantless arrest. 1 This statutory
language might be thought to confer on all "peace
officers" the right to arrest without warrant
anywhere within the state. While this view
seemed to prevail at one time/ the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has more recently rejected this
interpretation, holding in Christopher v. State3
that the statutory warrant exceptions do not
create the authority to arrest in any particular
place, but only to arrest without a warrant if
otherwise authorized to do so.4
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It has long been difficult to discern clearly the
jurisdictional boundaries for the exercises of a
Texas peace officer's warrantless arrest authority.
This is due in part to the variety of "peace officers" recognized in Texas law, and in part to the
numerous imprecise statutes which govern the
issue. It is also due largely to the difficulty in
defining what "jurisdiction" means in this context.
For courts, "jurisdiction" refers to the power or
authority to act respecting either the persons
before the court or the nature of the matter to be
adjudicated. Similarly, arrest "jurisdiction" may
mean the authority to arrest for certain kinds of
offenses, or it may refer to the power to make an
arrest in a certain territorial area. It is territorial
"jurisdiction," not jurisdiction to arrest for
differing types of offenses, that is most difficult to
confidently resolve in Texas. Resolution begins
with consideration of the person who will make
the arrest.
Who is a "peace officer?"
Article 2.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure purports to defme those persons who
are "peace officers." However, the statute is not
exclusive; other persons are designated peace
officers by various provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and Texas Revised Civil
Statute. The determination of whether an
arresting officer is a "peace officer," and, if so,
what kind of officer, is especially important in
determining that officer's territorial arrest
jurisdiction.
Because the employment status of a peace
officer ultimately decides the geographical
boundaries within which he may exercise his arrest
power, no single rule of territorial jurisdiction
applies to all peace officers. This article focuses
only on municipal police officers because such
officers are the most numerous kind of peace
officer, and because recent statutory amendments
and case law have greatly changed traditional
views of the territorial arrest jurisdiction of city
police.

At common law city officers were
limited to arrest within their '?Jai/iwick" or city limits. The only exception to this limitation was for "hot
pursuit. .. "
Territorial arrest authority is created for city
police officers by statute or, if no statute controls,
by common law. At common law city officers
were limited to arrest within their "bailiwick" or
city limits.5 The only exception to this limitation
was for "hot pursuit" begun within the city
boundaries resulting in an arrest outside the
officer's jurisdiction.6 The "hot pursuit" exception
remains intact; the common law rule limiting
arrests to the municipality does not.7
The common law rule has been abrogated by
the interpretation of Articles 998 and 999 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statues as legislatively
defming the territorial arrest jurisdiction of city
police officers. In Angel v. State,8 the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that since Article 998 gave
municipal police the same territorial "jurisdiction"
as city marshals,9 and since Article 999 granted
city marshals the same "jurisdiction" as the
sheriff, 10 city police, like the sheriff, could arrest
without warrant anywhere within the county in
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tion" of Type A city police officers as being the
same as a marshal of such a city. 18
With respect to the territorial arrest jurisdiction
of officers of Type A municipalities, the Court of
Criminal Appeals might interpret the Code as it
interpreted Articles 998 and 999 in Angel despite
differences in the language of the three statues. 19
But if it does so, what is to be made of the fact
that nothing is said about the territorial jurisdiction of Type C and home-rule municipalities? It
seems unlikely that the legislature intended to give
some city police officers county-wide arrest
jurisdiction while limiting other city police to citywide jurisdiction. It may be instead that the
legislature intended all city police officers to be
limited to arrest within their municipalities unless
a statute expressly expands that authority.

which the city is located.U
The reasoning in Angel is certainly subject to
dispute. It depends, for example, on the reading
of "jurisdiction" in Articles 998 and 999 as
referring to territorial jurisdiction rather than
likening the powers and authority of the city
officer to those of the city marshal and sheriff.
Moreover, the decision in Angel completely
overlooks the existence of Article 999b, a statute
which provided an expansion of the authority of a
city officer to areas outside his municipality when
an interlocal assistance agreement had been
executed with neighboring cities.U The implication of Article 999b is that the warrantless arrest
authority of city police officers is limited to the
officer's municipality, an idea consistent with the
common law rule confining a city officer to his
"bailiwick."13

In the same legislatwe that restructured the treatment of municipalities
and their police officers, one statute
was enacted which did expressly
expand the territorial arrest jurisdiction ofpolice officers_

The Code takes a different approach to classifying municipalities
and uses somewhat different language to describe the duties and authority of municipal police, all of
which further confuses the jurisdictionquestion.

In the same legislature that restructured the
treatment of municipalities and their police
officers, one statute was enacted which did
expressly expand the territorial arrest jurisdiction
of police officers. Article 14.03(c) also became
effective on September 1, 1987, and it provides
that, "A peace officer who is outside his jurisdiction may arrest, without warrant, a person who
commits an offense within the officer's presence
or view, if the offense is a felony or a violation of
Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code . . . ."2!J
To the extent that Article 14.03(c) authorizes a
city police officer, or any peace officer, to arrest
state-wide for on-view felonies, the statute merely
restates what has long been the law in Texas.
Article 14.01(a) permits "a peace officer or any
other person" to arrest without warrant when the
offense is committed in the presence or view of
the officer, if the offense is a felony or breach of
the public peace. 21 Like Article 18.16 (preventing
the consequences of theft), Article 14.01(a) has
been interpreted to permit any citizen, including
any peace officer, to arrest for certain offenses. 22
Article 14.03(c) goes beyond prior law in
authorizing state-wide warrantless arrests for

The impact of recent legislation
Regardless of whether the Court was correct in
Angel, the issue has not been laid to rest. Articles
998, 999, and 999b were codified in the new Texas
Local Government code effective September 1,
1987. The Code takes a different approach to
classifying municipalities and uses somewhat
different language to describe the duties and
authority of municipal police, 14 all of which
further confuses the jurisdiction question.
Municipalities are not classified as Type A,
Type B, or Type C general-law municipalities,
home-rule municipalities, or special-law municipalities.1s While Type A, Type C, and home-rule
municipalities may have police officers, no
provision is made for Type B municipalities to
maintain a police force. 16 Further, the new
statutes say nothing about the jurisdiction of
police officers in Type Cor home-rule municipalities, 17 and refer to the powers, rights, and jurisdic-
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misdemeanor violations of Title 9, Chapter 42. It
is unclear why these crimes were chosen for
special treatment, but it may be that the legislature thought them to be the equivalent of offenses
"against the public peace."
The bottom line
The difficulty in determining territorial arrest
jurisdiction is amply demonstrated by considering
the effect of current case law and statutes on a
single kind of peace officer. The arrest jurisdiction of a city police officer employed by a Type A
general-law municipality, for example, may be
summarized as follows:
1. "on-view'' felonies - the officer has state-wide
jurisdiction based on Articles 14.01(a) and
14.03(c), C.C.P.;
2. "on-view'' misdemeanors which breach the
public peace - officer has state-wide jurisdiction as
does "any other person" by authority of Article
14.01(a), C.C.P.;
3. "on-view'' misdemeanor violations of Title 9,
Chapter 42 of the Texas Penal Code - state-wide
jurisdiction provided by Article 14.03(c), C.C.P.;
4. theft offenses (misdemeanor or felony- need
not be "on-view'') - the officer, like "all persons,"
may arrest state-wide pursuant to Article 18.16,
C.C.P.;
5. all "on-view'' offenses in which "hot pursuit"
begins within municipal boundaries and capture
and arrest occurs outside city limits; 23
6. in all other situations, the officer's arrest
jurisdiction is county-wide. 24
Although it is supported by judicial decisions
and statues, this summary is no more than a "best
guess" in some respects. It assumes, for example,
that for officers of a Type A municipality, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would interpret
Chapter 341 of the Local Government Code in the
same way it interpreted the prior law in Articles
998 and 999 of the Revised Civil Code, an assumption that may not be warranted. Nevertheless, the
summary serves to demonstrate the synthesis of
various sources of law necessary to determine
when and where the Texas city police officer may
arrest. This demonstration is by no means
complete since it focuses only on officers of Type
A municipalities, and not on police in Type C or
home-rule municipalities. Moreover, it does not
address difficult questions concerning the scope of
the various statutory exceptions to the warrant
requirement.

....the ultimate solution lies in the
adoption of uniform legislation
expressly addressing territorial

arrest jurisdiction. ...
What is clear from this example is that Texas
law respecting territorial arrest jurisdiction is
presently unduly, and probably unworkably,
complex. While appellate courts in Texas may
adopt interpretations of recently enacted statutes
which somewhat clarify these limits, the ultimate
solution lies in the adoption of uniform legislation
expressly addressing territorial arrest jurisdiction.
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